AIR FRANCE 447 CRASH

Air France 447 crash is turning out to be more of a man vs machine and the perils of too much of automation. Crew skills in airline cockpit are on bane and with crews being exposed to situations never encountered before, the recovery from a situation tends to get more difficult.


Stall series practice every 6 months during recurrent has been order of the day in India when rest of the training systems round the world debated on the benefits of this when the airplane could never be stalled. Now, the order of the day is stall practice with emphasis on high altitude recovery.
Redundancy in automation and recovery by crew and the performance of crew when startled, are bound to affect the recovery and have a direct bearing on whether the aircraft could be saved from a a situation or not.
As STALL has assumed new dimensions in light of AF447 crash,introspection by the training fraternity on other latent safety concerns borne out of automation  could well help save potential untoward accidents from taking place.

COMMUNICATION. : Expectation Bias and Hear Back Errors

 Crew suffer from expectation bias if they are very familiar with say a clearance on a particular route which they have been frequenting more often.Crew tend to transpose information/clearance received with what is expected by them based on their familiarity or routine experience. This coupled with hear back error by ATC or in other words no correction by ATC to the misread clearance/ instruction could result in breach of safety and catastrophic consequences.  Share your thoughts, experiences and feedback on this topic by commenting on the same.

AUTOMATION -- Automation in the Cockpit

Is Automation in cockpit a boon or bane???

Increased automation in cockpits has changed radically how our cockpits look and work is carried on.

Either the automation is either too complex for human operators to comprehend, or is the information in the manuals inadequate, or is it the automation integration that seems to be the problem, or is it the lack of enough emphasis on the use of automation in the training curriculum the problem, or is it the complacency that sets in with overuse of automation and skills degeneration with overuse of automation the problem, or is the problem with operating procedures not adequately  addressing the use of automation in cockpits???

Send in your views

FLIGHT PROCEDURES-- Runway Veer-- Off

What is Runway Veer-off??

Runway veer-off is runway excursion in which an aircraft departs the side of the runway during take-off or landing.

 What factors contribute to a runway veer-off??

a. WEATHER

b. CREW TECHNIQUE/DECISION

c. AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

WEATHER

Runway Condition, Wet or Contaminated, Severe Wind, Cross wind , Windshear, Reverse thrust effect in a crosswind

and on Wet/Contaminated runway

CREW TECHNIQUE/DECISION

Use on Nose Wheel Steering at higher speeds

Airspeed too fast on runway to exit

Incorrect Cross wind landing technique--- a) Drifting during transition from a wings level crosswind approach(crabbed approach) to a steady-sideslip crosswind approach ,or failing to transition from a wings level approach to a steady-sideslip approach(decrab) in strong crosswind conditions.

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS

• Asymmetric thrust

• Non-deployment of speed brakes • Uncommanded differential braking

The runway veer-off is usually a result of one or more of above factors.

Following the company promulgated procedures, limitations, techniques; etc. will help in mitigating or managing the excursions.

FLIGHT PROCEDURES -- Go-Around Minded

0. If a go-around is initiated, the flight crew must not reverse the decision and retard the throttle/thrust levers as it is proven to be detrimental to flight safety.
   Reversing a go-around decision usually is observed when the decision to reject the landing and to initiate a go-around is taken by the one crew member, but is overridden by the other crewmember.
   Runway overruns, impact with obstructions and major aircraft damage (tyre burst,wing tip scrape or post impact fire) often are the consequences of reversing an already initiated rejected landing.