AIRCRAFT EVACUATION

TCAS TRAFFIC DISPLAY IS NOT RADAR DISPLAY

TCAS in aviation was mandated to facilitate greater situational awareness to the flight crew and serve as a last safety net to avoid mid-air collisions. Over the years, design Improvements in accuracy and response capability of TCAS systems are able to generate Traffic alerts and Resolution Advisories with manoeuvre guidance in case of RAs.

 Of late there have been several reported incidents of crew resorting to pre-emptive manoeuvres solely based on TCAS displays showing traffic proximity. Manoeuvres initiated to achieve self-separation or sequencing, solely on the information displayed on TCAS systems can often result in degraded safety margins and should never be attempted by the flight crew.

 "An A340 reduced its speed on its own, miles too early on approach, to increase the distance from the preceding aircraft [based on the TCAS traffic display]. It messed up the sequence and an A320 was then only 4 NM behind it was obliged to perform an "S" for delay".

A B737 is cleared to climb to 3000 ft. A VFR on an opposite track is level at 3500 ft, but offset horizontally. The controller provides traffic information to the B737. The pilot reports two targets on the TCAS traffic display and shortly after reports a left turn to avoid this traffic. Fortunately, the controller instructs the B737 to stop climb at 2500 ft, because the inappropriate turn reduced the separation.

Examples are many and continue to occur. Regulations on the use of TCAS traffic display at ICAO PANS-OPS Doc 8168, chapter 3, section 3.2, states that “Pilots shall not manoeuvre their aircraft in response to traffic advisories (TAs) only”. This point is also emphasised in ICAO ACAS II Training Guides for pilots. Confusing and nonstandard responses from pilots are also commonly encountered. Responses such as “TCAS Contact” or “We have the Traffic on TCAS”, on receiving traffic information from ATC, provide no added value. 

Flight crew need to appreciate that the TCAS traffic display is not designed to support self-separation manoeuvres, but to aid visual acquisition of an intruder. It gives only a snapshot of the relative horizontal and vertical position of other aircraft in the vicinity. The lack of speed vector and the possibility of rapidly changing relative bearings, it is extremely difficult to anticipate the evolution of the situation based solely on the TCAS traffic display.

Air traffic controllers, on the other hand, base their actions on the comprehensive information shown on the radar display, which enables them to provide a safe and expeditious air traffic flow. The radar display also provides velocity vectors and the controller is able to predictive information of crossing traffic. The TCAS traffic display does not provide the information necessary for the provision of self-separation and sequencing.

When operating IFR in a controlled airspace, ATC is responsible to provide safe separation between traffic. TCAS II is designed to trigger an RA command, should there be a potential or imminent risk of collision between two transponder equipped aircraft. Correct response to annunciated RAs will safely resolve such situations.

If an aircraft is close to its operational ceiling or where the indicated rate climb is excessive, it may simply be unable to follow the RA commands. In these cases, the pilot should continue to manoeuvre at the maximum rate possible consistent with safety and performance. If unable to climb, it may even maintain level flight( engine out conditions).The TCAS equipment in the target aircraft will be able to detect the reduced response and adjust the manoeuvre commands to achieve the desired separation.

Airline operators need to include an unambiguous policy in their Operations Manual procedures, prohibiting self-separation manoeuvres by the crew based solely on TCAS displays.

Strong Winds Captured on Navigational Display on A330

Check this out  !!!!


Wind speed at 182 kts captured on Navigational display on A330

GLOBAL ACCIDENT RATE REACHES NEW LOW IN 2011 says IATA

Montreal - The International Air Transport Association (IATA) announced that the 2011 accident rate for Western-built jets was the lowest in aviation history, surpassing the previous mark set in 2010.

The 2011 global accident rate (measured in hull losses per million flights of Western-built jets) was 0.37, the equivalent of one accident every 2.7 million flights. This represented a 39% improvement compared to 2010, when the accident rate was 0.61, or one accident for every 1.6 million flights. A hull loss is an accident in which the aircraft is destroyed or substantially damaged and not subsequently repaired for whatever reason including a financial decision by the owner. 


 "Safety is the air transport industry’s number one priority. It is also a team effort. The entire stakeholder community—airlines, airports, air navigation service providers and safety regulators--works together every day to make the skies safer based on global standards. As a result, flying is one of the safest things that a person could do. But, every accident is one too many, and each fatality is a human tragedy. The ultimate goal of zero accidents keeps everyone involved in aviation focused on building an ever safer industry,” said Tony Tyler, IATA’s Director General and CEO. 


Safety by the numbers:

·     2.8 billion people flew safely on 38 million flights (30 million by jet, 8 million by turboprop)

·     11 hull loss accidents involving Western-built jets compared to 17 in 2010

·     92 total accidents (all aircraft types, Eastern and Western built) down from 94 in 2010

·     5 fatal hull loss accidents involving Western-built jets down from 8 in 2010

·     22 fatal accidents (all aircraft types) versus 23 in 2010

·     486 fatalities compared to 786 in 2010

·     Fatality rate dropped to 0.07 per million passengers from 0.21 in 2010 based on Western-built jet operations

Runway Excursions

Runway excursions, in which an aircraft departs a runway during a landing or takeoff, were the most common type of accident in 2011 (18% of total accidents). This is slightly reduced from 2010 when runway excursions accounted for 21% of total accidents reflecting industry efforts to reduce their frequency. Despite industry growth, the absolute number of runway excursions decreased from 23 in 2009 to 20 in 2010 and 17 in 2011. Eighty eight percent of runway excursions occurred during landing. Unstable approaches--situations where the aircraft is too fast, above the glide slope, or touches down beyond the desired touchdown point--and contaminated runways are among the most common contributing factors to runway excursions on landing.

More from IATA at :

http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2012-03-06-01.aspx

A330 FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE

A330 Fuel Leak Procedure is best dealt by crew with a background 

understanding of the checklist logic and the system understanding.
Fuel leak on A330 reminds one of Air Transat 236 emergency landing at 
Azores in 2001.

In order to simplify the understanding of this checklist procedure, the same has 
been indicated in flow pattern below in the slides. 
Hope the same is of use to all crew in better understanding of the checklist 
and feel free to write to me with comments and suggestions.